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Abstract. Transitivity in trust is very often considered as a quite simple 
property, trivially inferable from the classical transitivity defined in 
mathematics, logic, or grammar. In fact the complexity of the trust notion 
suggests evaluating the relationships with the transitivity in a more adequate 
way. In this paper, starting from a socio-cognitive model of trust, we analyze 
the different aspects and conceptual frameworks involved in this relation and 
show how different interpretations of these concepts produce different solutions 
and definitions of trust transitivity. 
1 Introduction 
Many different approaches and models of trust were developed in the last 15 years [1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]: they contributed to clarify many aspects and problems about trust and 
trustworthiness, although many issues remain to be addressed and some elementary 
but not so trivial trust properties are left in a contradictory form. 
One of them is the problem of trust transitivity. If X trusts Y, and Y trusts Z: What 
about the trust relationship between X and Z? Different and sometimes diverging 
answers were given to this problem. The question is not only theoretically relevant; it 
is very relevant from the practical point of view. 
In fact one of the main problems of trusting agents in an open and massive multi-
agent world is the necessity of exploiting the cumulated trust by other trustees (who 
we trust) for trusting agents who they know but for us unknown. But, how does this 
trust-transfer work? Which are the sophisticated basic cognitive mechanisms for 
doing this? 
In this paper we will present an analysis of the trust transitivity when a socio-
cognitive model of trust is taken into consideration. Through this kind of model we 
are able to evaluate and partially cope with the complexity that the concept of 
transitivity introduces when applied to the trust relationship.  
We cannot in fact just rely on our direct and personal experience; this would restrict 
too much our interaction possibilities and "market", and also our "trust capital" (how 
many people and how much trust us, and would be interested in exchanging with us). 
This precious information not only is preserved in our memory, from previous 
interactions; but it is generalized (to groups and categories [14, 15]) for making 
predictions about new people; it is acquired from the others by observation and use of 
'signals' (I see that X exchange with Y), or by communication (advices, 
recommendations, reputation, etc); it is acquired from Y's exhibition of his skills, 
products, virtues, qualities (signaling and "marketing").
So, trust (and distrust) information is circulating a lot as a precious good, and trust has 
a very active social dynamics in the sense of transfer from one trustor to another, 
from one trustee to another, from context to context, from task to task. This 
phenomenon is so important that there is the need of clarifying and explicitly 
modeling the specific mechanism of this trust "circulation". 
2 A socio-cognitive model of trust  
In our socio-cognitive model of trust [8, 9] we consider trust as a relational construct 
between the trustor (X), the trustee (Y), about a defined (more or less specialized) task 
(!). Introducing a formal operator Trust, representing the trust notion, we can write: 
where are also explicitly present both the X’s goal (gX, respect to which trust is 
tested/activated) and the role of the context (C) in which the relationship is going to 
happens. In fact, the successful performance of the task !  will satisfy the goal gX. Task 
is the performace X needs and expects from Y; what X relies on Y for. 
Using Meyer, van Linder, van der Hoek et al.’s logics [13] we can introduce the X’s 
mental ingredients of trust. They mainly are the goal gX, and a set of main trustor’s 
beliefs: 
! 
Bel(X CanY (")), 
! 
Bel(X WillY (")) , 
! 
Bel(X ExtFactY ("))  
where: 
Bel is the classical modal operator for representing agents’ beliefs; 
CanY (!) means that Y is potentially able to do ! (in the sense that, under the given 
conditions, is competent, has the internal powers, skills, know-how, etc); (and in the 
above formula this is what is believed by X); 
WillY (!) means that, under the given conditions, Y has potentially the attributions for 
being willing, persistent, available, etc., on the task ! (and in the above formula this is 
what is believed by X); 
ExtFactY (!) means that there are a set of external conditions either favoring or 
hindering Y realizing the task ! (and in the above formula is clear that also this is 
believed by X). 
In our model we also consider that trust can be graded: X can have a strong trust that 
Y will realize the task (maybe 0.95 in the range (0,1)); or even just a sufficient trust 
that Y will achieve it (maybe 0.6 with a threshold of 0.55; and so on with other 
possible values). For this we have introduced a trust quantification, calling it the 
Degree of Trust, DoTXY!, and, in general, a threshold (") to be overcome from this 
DoTXY!. 
Given the previous analysis of the main components of the trust attitude (gX, Bel (X 
CanY (!)), Bel (X WillY (!)), Bel (X ExtFactY (!))), our model is also able to evaluate 
how a specific degree of trust is, on its turn, resultant from the several quantifications 
of these components: 
! 
DoTXY" = f (DoCX (OppY (")),DoCX (CompetenceY (")),DoCX (WillingnessY (")))  
! 
Trust (X Y C " gX )
where: f is in general a function that preserves monotonicity; 
DoCX (OppY(!)) is the X’s degree of credibility about the external opportunities 
(positively or negatively) interfering with Y’s action in realizing the task ! ; 
DoCX (CompetenceY(!)) is the X’s degree of credibility about the Y’s 
ability/competence to perform ! ; 
DoCX (WillingnessY(!)) is the X’s degree of credibility about the Y’s willingness to 
perform ! . 
We are ignoring the subjective certainty of the pertinent beliefs (how much sure is X 
of its evalutative beliefs about that specific quality about either Y’s or the 
environment, that is a meta-belief; in first approximation we can say that this factor is 
integrated with the other). 
At the same time we are ignoring for now the value of the goal (gX). In fact, this value 
(its level of relevance) should have a specific and complex influence on the degree of 
the threshold ("): increasing the relevance of the goal both should increase the 
caution of the trustor of not entrusting a too unreliable trustee (pushing to increase the 
threshold), and should increase the need of not missing the opportunity to achieve it 
(pushing to decrease the threshold). Of course, both factors of trustor’s personality 
and the set of potential viable alternatives than that trustee have also to be considered 
for defining the complex relationships between threshold and goal. 
So trivially X will trust Y about the task ! if 
! 
DoTXY" >#  
that means that a set of analogous conditions must be realized about the other 
quantitative elements (DoCX (OppY(!)), DoCX (CompetenceY(!)), DoCX 
(WillingnessY(!))).  
We do not consider in this paper the detailed analysis of how the degree of trust is 
resulting by the more elementary components. We also omit of considering the 
potential correlations among the different components. 
In addition, we should also say that all the components above showed (competence, 
willingness, external factors) are in fact not the more elementary ones; they can be 
described as resultant by more elementary reasons/components. For example, the 
competence dimension could be considered as constituted by the know-how, the self-
confidence, and the ability sub-components; and so on. 
Also, introducing the concept of trustworthiness degree of an agent we call 
TrustworthinessYC(!) 
the Y’s trustworthiness about the task !, in the context C. In general the 
trustworthiness of an agent is a property of that agent1. We have in fact two different 
meanings of this concept: 
- an objective trustworthiness, what the agent is actually able and willing to do in 
standard conditions; his/her actual reliability on a more or less specific task. 
- a subjective trustworthiness, the perceived reliability of the trustee by another agent; 
it could be different for the different trustors. 
The situation is also more complex, because the objective trustworthiness may not be 
costant with respect to the trustor but the same trustee Y could be differently 
trustworthy on the same task with different trustors (for example X or Z) (suppose he 
                                                           
1 In fact the trustworthiness (as trust) derives from specific properties of the trustee that could 
change during the time both for intrinsic reasons and for external conditions. 
has different motivations for helping/serving X and Z). For this we introduce also the 
variable X in the operator:  TrustworthinessYXC(!). 
Supposing the situation in which the context is constant, if we have: 
! 
DoTXY" >#  
it derives that:  
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (") > #) 
Where #  is the minimum value of trustworthiness for Y (as believed by X) for 
delegating to him the task !.  In general "=# . 
3 Transitivity in Trust 
The transitivity property of trust can be presented as: if X trusts Y, and Y trusts Z: 
What about the trust relationship between X and Z? 
We are interested to translate this problem in our terms of trust. 
First of all, we do not consider the unspecified case “X trusts Y” because in our model 
an agent has to trust another agent with respect a task (either very well defined or less 
defined and abstract); this task directly derives from the goal the trustor has to reach 
with the trust attribution. So we have to transform “X trusts Y” in “X trusts Y about 
!”. And given the graded qualification of trust we have that:  
! 
DoTXY" >#  
this means in particular that X believes that Y is potentially able and willing to do !  
and that the external conditions in which Y will perform its task are at least not so 
opposite to the task realization (may be also they are neutral or favorable). 
So this Y’s trustworthiness with respect to X (perceived/believed by X) about ! is 
based on these specific beliefs. 
At the same way “Y trusts Z” becomes “Y trusts Z about !1” (about the difference 
between ! and !1, see later) with the same kind of particular Y’s beliefs about Z and 
the external conditions. 
Also in this case we can say that there is a threshold to be overcome and the 
condition:  
! 
DoTYZ"1 >#1 
successfully satisfied in case of trust attribution. 
In order to transfer/adopt trust as mere evaluation, esteem, potential expectation 
(disposition) it is necessary to at least examine the task, that is, "about what" X trusts 
Y, and Y trusts Z; and possibly on which bases (the ascribed qualities). But, in order to 
transfer trust as 'decision' to rely on, as 'act' of trusting (from the decision of Y to 
trust/rely on Z to the decision of X to entrust Z), something more is necessary: the 
degree of trust and its thresholds. 
If we have to consider the trust relationship between “X and Z” as a consequence of 
the previous trust relationships between “X and Y” and between “Y and Z” we have to 
specify the task on which this relationship should be based (question of assimilation 
between ! and !1) and the degree of trust that must be overcome even from X: 
! 
DoTXZ" >#2  with the consideration of the threshold "2. 
The role of the trust threshold is quite complex and can have an overlapping with the 
ingredients of trust. We strongly simplify in this case considering "  as dependent just 
from the specific intrinsic characteristics of the trustor (those that define an agent 
intrinsically: prudent, reckless, and so on) independently from the external 
circumstances (on the contrary, these factors affect the degree of trust, by affecting 
the more elementary beliefs above showed). 
So, we can say that in this approximation:  "   = "2 
In the case in which all the agents are defined as having the same intrinsic 
characteristics (possible for artificial entities), we can also say that: "   = "1 = "2 
Moreover, as we just saw, not less important in our approach is that trust is an 
expectation and a bet grounded on and justified by certain beliefs about Y. X trusts Y 
on the basis of the evaluation of Y’s "virtues/qualities", not just on the basis of a 
statistical sampling, some probability. 
The evaluations about the needed “qualities” of Y for ! are the mediator for the 
decision to trust Y. This mediation role is fundamental also in trust transitivity. 
Let us now consider the case of the differences between the tasks in the different 
relationships. 
For the trust transitivity the two tasks should be the same (!  = !1). Is this enough? 
Suppose for example that there are 3 agents: John, Mary and Peter; and suppose that 
John trusts Mary about “organizing scientific meetings” (task !), at the same time 
Mary trusts Peter about “organizing scientific meetings” (again task !). Can we 
deduce that, given the transitivity of trust: John trusts Peter about “organizing 
scientific meetings”? Is in fact transferable that task evaluation? Given the trust model 
defined in §2 the situation is more complex and there are possible pitfalls lurking: 
Mary is the central node for that trust transfer and she plays different roles (and 
functions) in the first case (when her trustworthiness is about to realize the task ! , and 
in the second case (when her trustworthiness is about evaluating the Peter’s 
trustworthiness on the task !). 
The situation is even clearer if we split in the example the two kinds of competences: 
X trusts very much Y as medical doctor; X knows that Y trusts Z as mechanic; will X 
trust Z as mechanic?  Not necessarily at all: if X believes that Y is a good evaluator of 
mechanics he will trust Z; but, if X believes that Y is a very naive in this domain, and 
is frequently swindled by people, he will not trust Z. 
So for considering transitivity of trust as a valid property we have to assimilate the 
task with the evaluation of that task itself: 
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (") ># )  implies 
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (eval(")) ># ) 
In words, X has to believe that if Y is sufficiently trustworthy on the task ! , it is also 
sufficiently trustworthy on the meta-task of evaluating ! . 
The reasons for X trusting Y on the task !  have to be based on beliefs that in some 
way support also the reasons for trusting Y on the meta-task of evaluating ! (or on a 
different task !’). More analytically, the qualities (in both the directions: competence 
and willingness) that X is attributing to Y about the task ! , support, directly or for 
analogy, also the qualities necessary for trusting Y about the meta-task of evaluating !  
(or on a different task !’). 
So resuming we have the more basic case (case A) of the relationship between trust 
and transitivity so defined (we assume "="X="Y): 
if 
iA) 
! 
DoTXY" >#  (X trusts Y about !) and 
iiA) 
! 
DoTYZ" >#  (Y trusts Z about ! ) and 
iiiA) 
! 
Bel(X DoTYZ" ># )  (X believes that Y trusts Z about !) and 
ivA)
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (") ># ) implies 
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (eval(")) ># )  
(Y is sufficiently trustworthy in the realization of the task and in evaluating others performing 
that task) 
then 
vA) 
! 
DoTXZ" >#  (X trusts Z about ! ) 
We have to underline that (iiA) should not necessarily be true, the important thing is 
that is true (iiiA). 
In the case (B) in which the tasks are different (
! 
" # " ' ), we have: 
if 
iB) 
! 
DoTXY" >#  (X trusts Y about !) and 
iiB) 
! 
DoTYZ"' >#  (Y trusts Z about ! ) and 
iiiB) 
! 
Bel(X DoTYZ"' ># ) (X believes that Y trusts Z about !’) and 
ivB)
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (") ># )  implies 
! 
Bel(X TrustworthinessYX (eval("')) ># )  
then 
vB) 
! 
DoTXZ"' >#  (X trusts Z about ! ’) 
In the case B, the transitivity essentially depends from the implication reported in the 
formula (iiiB); are there elements in the reasons (believed by X) for trusting Y on the 
task !  that (in X’s view) are sufficient also for trusting Y on the evaluation of a 
different task !’? 
 
3.1 Competence and Willingness in Transitivity 
The need for a careful qualitative consideration of the nature of the link between the 
trustor and the trustee, is even more serious. 
Not only it is fundamental (as we have argued) to make explicit and do not forget the 
specific “task” (activity, and thus “qualities”) X is trusting Y or Z about, but it is even 
necessary to consider the different dimensions/components of the trust disposition 
(evaluation), decision, and relation. 
In our model, trust has two basic nucleuses: 
(i) Y’s competence, ability, for correctly performing the delegated task; 
(ii) Y’s willingness to do it, to act as expected. 
The two dimensions (and ‘virtues’ of Y) are quite independent on each other: Y might 
be very well disposed and willing to do, but not very competent or unable; Y might be 
very expert and skilled, but not very reliable: unstable, unpredictable, not well 
disposed, insincere, dishonest, etc. 
Now, this (at least) double dimension affect transitivity. In fact, even assuming that 
the competence is rather stable (and that Y is a good evaluator of Z’s competence) not 
necessarily Z’s willingness is equally stable and transferable from Y to X. This is a 
more relation-based dimension. 
Y was evaluating Z’s willingness to do as expected on the basis of their specific 
relation. Is Z a friend of Y? Is there a specific benevolence, or values sharing, or 
gratitude and reciprocity, or obligation and hierarchical relation, etc.?  Not necessarily 
the reasons that Z would have for satisfying Y’s expectation and delegation would be 
present (or equally important) towards X. X’s relation with Z might be very different. 
Are the reasons/motives motivating Z towards Y, and making him reliable, 
transferable or equally present towards X? Only in this case it would be reasonable for 
X to adopt Y’s trustful attitude and decision towards Z. 
Only certain kinds of relations will be generalized from Y to X; for example, if Y 
trusts Z only because it is an economic exchange, only for Z’s interest in money, 
reasonably X can become a new client of Z; or if Y relies on Z because Z is a 
charitable person, generously helping (without any prejudice and discrimination) poor 
suffering people, and X is in the same condition of Y, then also X can trust in Z. 
 
3.2 Trust Dynamics affects Transitivity 
 
Moreover, we have shown ([8], [9]) that Z’s willingness, and even ability, can be 
affected, increased, by Y’s trust and reliance (this can affect Z’s commitment, pride, 
effort, attention, study, and so on). Z’s trustworthiness is improved by Y’s trust and 
delegation. And Y might predict and calculate this in her decision to rely on Z. 
However, not necessarily the effect of Y on Z’s trustworthiness will be produced also 
by another trustor. Thus, also this will affect “transitivity”: suppose that Y’s trust and 
delegation to Z makes him more trustworthy, improves Z’s willingness or ability (and 
Y trusts and relies on Z on the basis of such expectation); not necessarily X’s reliance 
on Z would have the same effect. Thus even if X knows that Y reasonably trusts Z (for 
something) and that he is a good evaluator and decision-maker, not necessarily X can 
have the same trust in Z, since perhaps Z’s trustworthiness would not be equally 
improved by X’s reliance. 
4 Transitivity and Trust: Related Work 
The concept of trust transitivity has been considered in other approaches. 
A relevant example is given from the Josang’s approach; he introduces the subjective 
logics (an attempt of overcoming the limits of the classical logics) for taking in 
consideration the uncertainty, the ignorance and the subjective characteristics of the 
beliefs. Using this approach Josang addressed the problem of trust transitivity [10], 
where it is recognized the intrinsic cognitive nature of this phenomenon. However, 
the main limits of this approach are that trust is in fact the trust in the information 
sources; and the transitivity regards two different tasks (referred to our formalism: ! ! 
!1: X has to trust the evaluation of Y (task !) with respect Z as realizing another task 
(task !1, for example as mechanic).  As we showed before, this difference is really 
relevant for the transitivity phenomenon. In addition, also the first task (Y as 
evaluator) is just analyzed with respect to the property of sincerity (and this is a 
confirmation of the constrained view of trust phenomenon; they write: “A’s disbelief 
in the recommending agent B means that A thinks that B consistently recommends the 
opposite of his real opinion about the truth value of x”; where A, B, and x are, in our 
terms, respectively X, Y and !1). But in trusting someone as evaluator of another agent 
(with respect to a specific task), I have also to consider his competence as evaluator, 
not just his sincerity. Trust is based on ascribed qualities. Y could be completely 
sincere but at the same time completely inappropriate to evaluate that task. 
Other authors [11, 12], developed algorithms for inferring trust among agents not 
directly connected. These algorithms differ from each other in the way they compute 
trust values and propagate those values in the networks. 
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